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376 Abstract
There is an emerging consensus at international level that systemic transforma-
tions are needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such 
transformations require paradigm shifts in policies, with appropriate governance 
frameworks to implement them. Fundamental transformations are likely to gener-
ate winners and losers; the latter may act strategically to deter transformation. 
Most governance literature points at mutual gains negotiation methods to prevent 
the emergence of losers and create ‘win-win’ package deals. In this article a dif-
ferent – and less researched – approach will be discussed: (economic) compensa-
tion strategies. Drawing on the political economy literature of reform in transition 
economies, I propose three compensation strategies to buy out or weaken the 
opposition of strategic losers – big bang, optimal sequencing and divide-and-rule 
governance reforms – that can help to frame discussions around the political fea-
sibility of new governance frameworks for SDG transformations. The paper sug-
gests that careful consideration needs to be given to the design of these compensa-
tion packages, since history tells us that buying acceptance for reform can involve 
not just variation in economic outcomes, it can also have long-term political 
implications and distributional effects.
Keywords: sustainable development, governance reforms, political constraints, 
compensating transfers, energy decarbonisation, transition economies 
1 INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging consensus among academics, researchers and policy makers 
concerned with how to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that sus-
tainable development requires systemic transformations (e.g., TWI2050, 2018; 
UNDESA, 2019; Sachs et al., 2019a). The World in 2050 (TWI2050) research initia-
tive – a collaboration between the Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
(SDSN), the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Stock-
holm Resilience Centre and Columbia University – proposes six exemplary transfor-
mations for achieving the SDGs and long-term sustainability: digital revolution; smart 
cities; energy decarbonization; sustainable consumption and production; sustainable 
food, biosphere and water, and human capacity and demography (TWI2050, 2018). 
There is less consensus in this literature, however, about how to implement these 
transformations, though it is widely held that crucially this requires fundamental shifts 
in public policy and governance, encompassing, for example, major reforms in areas 
such as economic and social policies, long-term integrated planning, public institu-
tions and political processes, new stakeholder engagement mechanisms, aligned 
budgeting practices and procedures, among many others (SDSN and OECD, 2019; 
TWI2050, 2018; Schmidt-Traub, Obersteiner and Mosnier, 2019; OECD, 2019; 
UNDESA, 2019; Niestroy et al., 2019; Meadowcroft, 2011). These transformations 
need to be designed for, directed and adapted to country contexts, e.g., levels of devel-
opment, political and social realities, local strengths, unique needs and governance 
structures (Sachs et al., 2019a). Each country must follow its own path and reforms 
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377governance styles, may be important as they are a way of dealing with context 
(UNCEPA, 2019; Meuleman, 2018; Meuleman and Niestroy, 2015; Niestroy, 2005).
Most important perhaps, relatively little is known about the political feasibility of 
different transformations in different contexts. It is recognized that transforma-
tions may be deeply political (Meadowcroft, 2011; Scoones, Leach and Newell, 
2015; Smith and Stirling, 2010; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013; Cherp et al., 2018), 
and that this poses a challenge for governance, such as dealing with vested inter-
ests, the short-termism of policy and political cycles, the resistance of the wealthy 
to taxation, displaced workers and communities, deficits in representation, and the 
lack of public awareness of and support for transformation (e.g., TWI2050, 2018; 
Burch et al., 2019; Sovacool et al., 2017; Hausknost and Haas, 2019). What has 
not yet been researched in-depth is the impact on the feasibility of sustainability 
transformations of those who consider themselves ‘losers’ of the change. 
This is a key question, as these transformations are likely to create winners and 
losers and the greatest obstacle to reform is often the opposition of vested interest 
groups that stand to lose most from changes in the status quo. For example, the 
U.S. Fossil Fuel Lobby has, through a combination of lobbying, regulatory cap-
ture, and investments in disinformation, consistently blocked the enactment of 
climate policies that might have facilitated energy decarbonization, despite 
mounting evidence of human-induced climate change and its effects (Hess, 2014; 
Geels, 2014; Brulle, 2014; Erickson et al., 2015; Erickson and Lazarus, 2013; 
Seto et al., 2016). This example and others like the agricultural lobbyists’ role in 
blocking trade policy reforms (e.g. Baldwin, 2016) raise important questions 
about whether the governance reforms required for SDG transformations will 
generate ‘strategic’ losers, i.e. losers who try to block transformations, and if so, 
what, if anything, can, and should, be done to overcome this political constraint.
There are various ways to deal with opposition of ‘losers’. Governance literature 
tends to promote mutual gains negotiation methods to prevent the emergence of 
losers and create ‘win-win’ package deals (Susskind and Field, 1996; Moomaw 
and Papa, 2012). This is a typical tool of the network governance approach, which 
is consensus-oriented, values trust, favours dialogue and partnerships, as well as 
other informal arrangements. In this article a different – and less researched – 
approach will be discussed: (economic) compensation strategies for enacting 
reforms (e.g. Roland, 2002). This relates to the market governance style, which 
prefers market-based instruments like taxes and focuses on principles such as effi-
ciency, competition, devolvement and empowerment (Meuleman, 2018). Indeed, 
these approaches could also be combined in some situations, e.g. when winners 
and ‘losers’ agree to engage in collaborative problem solving, to broaden the 
acceptance of SDG measures (Horan, 2019; Meuleman, 2018).
In public economics, the traditional approach to solving problems involving win-
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378 welfare losses of the losers by redistributing the gains of the winners (Kaldor, 
1939; Hicks 1939; 1940). Subsequent research shows that the optimality of this 
approach depends on several considerations, such as how the transfer is financed 
(e.g. lump-sum or distortionary taxes), the ability to identify winners and losers to 
target transfers (e.g. asymmetric information), the size of the transfer (e.g. short-
term budget and borrowing constraints), as well as the economies’ initial condi-
tions and assumptions governing the partial and general equilibrium effects of the 
intervention (e.g. Kaplow, 2004; 2012; Hendren, 2014; Tsyvinski and Werquin, 
2018). Increasingly, compensating transfers that account for these considerations 
are seen as a way to mitigate the negative effects of economic disruptions in areas 
such as immigration (Card, 2009), trade liberalization (Antras, de Gortari and 
Itskhoki, 2016), and technical change, e.g. automation, robotics, etc. (Katz and 
Murphy, 1992; Tsyvinski and Werquin, 2018). 
Similar questions around the importance of political constraints in transition pro-
cesses arise in older debates about pro-market reform in transition economies 
which focused on finding politically feasible reform paths. Here, opposing sides of 
the debate argued over the pace and sequencing of reforms, e.g. ‘big bang’ versus 
gradualist reform strategies, and, in particular, what reforms would buy out or 
weaken losers. Many reforms involved some amount of compensation to buy the 
acceptance of losers, typically managers and workers of state-owned companies 
and sectoral ministries (e.g., Shleifer and Treisman, 2000; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2005). 
These ranged from mass privatizations in Russia involving the giveaway of state 
assets to insiders, to partial privatizations in Poland and Hungary, to dual-track 
liberalization in China that liberalized prices at the margin while protecting the 
rents that various economic actors had under the planning system (Roland, 2002).
This article concentrates on compensation strategies to overcome political con-
straints to new governance frameworks for SDG transformations. It examines dif-
ferent strategies identified by the literature on the political economy of reform in 
transition economies and assesses their relevance to governance reforms for SDG 
implementation. It focuses primarily on compensation packages that governments 
could use to ease opposition from vested interests, such as the owners of fossil 
fuels, the beneficiaries of unsustainable land and ocean practices (e.g. TWI2050, 
2018). Following Roland (2002), the article addresses two types of political con-
straints to governance reform, relevant in democratic contexts characterized by 
some degree of state capture by vested interests. First, there is political acceptabil-
ity, such as, e.g., the willingness of the majority to accept reforms that involve 
compensating transfers to ‘losers’. Second, there is, what I term, insider accepta-
bility, such as the willingness of strategic losers, e.g. the fossil-fuel industry, to 
accept reforms given the compensation package offered to them. 
Specifically, the paper identifies two key areas: strategic losers from governance 
reforms and the role of compensation strategies in the political economy of new 
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379enact SDG transformations. I argue that the idea of compensating ‘losers’, e.g. the 
owners of fossil fuels, should be addressed more systematically in analyses of 
governance reforms when political will is essential for the success of the SDG 
transformation. The rationale for this is purely pragmatic: without such compen-
satory transfers, there is a risk that strategic losers will use their economic and 
political power to hinder support for these reforms and thus block transformations 
required to achieve the SDGs (Horan, 2019). This contrasts with the rationales 
given in the socio-technical literature on transitions which focus on justice and 
equity (e.g. Sovacool, 2014; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2016; 
Jenkins, McCauley and Forman, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2017).
Drawing on the political economy literature of reform in transition economies, 
this article proposes three compensation strategies to buy out or weaken the oppo-
sition of losers to new governance frameworks for SDG transformations – big 
bang, optimal sequencing and divide-and-rule governance reform strategies – that 
can help to frame discussions around the political feasibility of new governance 
frameworks. The article suggests that careful consideration needs to be given to 
the design of these compensation packages. Lessons from the transition economy 
experience tell us that buying acceptance for reform can involve not just variation 
in economic outcomes, it can also have long-term political implications and dis-
tributional effects (e.g. Roland, 2002). On the other hand, recent bank bailouts 
suggest such compensation packages need to go beyond piecemeal policy meas-
ures and enact comprehensive new governance frameworks to achieve transfor-
mation (e.g. Ferguson, Jorgenson and Chen, 2017; Thakor, 2018; Kane, 2018; 
Swagel, 2015; De Francesco and Maggetti, 2018; Grossman and Woll, 2014; 
TWI2050, 2018; UN, 2019). 
This is not the first article on aspects of the political economy of governance 
reform for the SDGs. TWI2050 (2018) identifies five obstacles to SDG transfor-
mations, including vested interests and regulatory capture. Church, Crawford and 
Schaller (2019) propose foreign policy as a tool for overcoming obstacles. Horan 
(2019) and Nerini et al. (2019) assign a key role to multi-stakeholder partnerships. 
Socio-technical studies of energy transition highlight displaced workers, commu-
nities and vulnerable groups and the role of training in building their support for 
transition (Sovacool, 2014; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015; Jenkins et al., 2016; 
Jenkins, McCauley and Forman, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2017), yet largely neglect 
negative impacts on owners and managers of fossil fuels, which can pose a bigger 
politico-economic obstacle to transition. 
The article aims to contribute to the emerging literature on the governance frame-
works required for SDG transformations (e.g. TWI2050, 2018; OECD, 2019; 
SDSN and OECD, 2019). This literature recognizes vested interests as an impor-
tant obstacle to SDG transformations, e.g. owners of fossil fuel companies, those 
benefitting from unsustainable land and ocean practices such as cattle ranchers and 


























































43 (4) 375-400 (2019)
380 that could be used to overcome their opposition to new governance reforms to initi-
ate these transformations, highlighting there are different ways to deal with strate-
gic losers, the political feasibility of which likely varies across countries.
The article also aims to add to the literature on sustainability governance (e.g. 
Meuleman, 2018; Meuleman and Niestroy, 2015; Meadowcroft, Farell and Span-
genberg, 2005). This literature argues that sustainable development is above all 
about getting the governance right (e.g. Meadowcroft, 2011: 536), and four main 
governance approaches are identified – hierarchical, network, market and meta-
governance (e.g. Meuleman, 2008; 2018, Larasson, 2015; Jessop, 2011; Sorensen, 
2006; Kooiman, 2003; Powell et al., 1991; Thompson et al., 1991; Thorelli, 1986). 
This article addresses vested interests as an obstacle to sustainability transforma-
tions, focusing on strategic losers and removing their hold on governance and 
policy (e.g. Treadway et al. 2005; Painter, 2014). It supplements the mutual gains 
negotiation approach (Susskind and Field, 1996; Susskind, McKearnen and 
Thomas-Larmer, 1999; Moomaw and Papa, 2012; Barrett, 2002), with an eco-
nomic approach based on compensation strategies, highlighting some strengths 
and weaknesses with the approach. 
2 GOVERNANCE REFORMS FOR SDG TRANSFORMATIONS
This section briefly describes the main elements of new governance frameworks 
advocated in the growing literature on SDG transformations. This literature recog-
nizes the enormous and complex governance challenges posed by sustainable 
development, and consequently, the frameworks proposed in this policy-oriented 
literature set out economic, social and political reforms. Together, these reforms, 
if implemented in full, would represent a major paradigm shift from existing 
national-level governance frameworks for the SDGs. It is difficult to ascertain ex-
ante the extent to which such frameworks can succeed in achieving transforma-
tion, but they are likely to be met with considerable opposition from strategic 
losers and require broad public support for their implementation.
SDG transformations are a way to organize the implementation of the SDGs (SDSN 
and OECD, 2019). The approach draws heavily on analyses that map out interde-
pendencies among SDG outcomes (e.g. Nilsson, Griggs and Visbeck, 2016; ICSU 
and ISSC, 2016). Each transformation, e.g. energy decarbonization, groups key SDG 
interventions, i.e. interventions that generate significant economic, social and envi-
ronmental co-benefits, such as access to clean energy, zero-carbon electricity genera-
tion, energy efficiency, electrification and zero-carbon fuels, and curbing pollution, 
in a single area, e.g. the energy system, with the aim of synergistically achieving 
multiple SDGs (Sachs et al., 2019b). For example, energy decarbonization is 
expected to contribute directly to SDGs 3, 6, 7, 9, 11-15 and to reinforce several 
other goals (Sachs et al., 2019b). In a similar way, SDG transformations are proposed 
for other areas such as education, health systems, urban infrastructure, ecosystems 
and agriculture, as well as digital technologies (e.g. SDSN, 2019; UNDESA, 2019; 
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381very least, an entry point for governments to achieve the SDGs (TWI2050, 2018; 
UNDESA, 2019). To operationalize transformations, long-term policy pathways or 
plans are proposed that organize interventions around time-bound measurable tar-
gets, interim milestones, problems to be solved and potential solutions, pathways 
that need to be adapted to local contexts (SDSN, 2019; SDSN and OECD, 2019).
To guide the development of governance frameworks for SDG transformations, 
there is a large literature on transitions and transition management that spans sev-
eral disciplines and domains. Most of this literature has looked into specific issues 
or sectors, such as economic systems and market forces (Nee, 1989; Roland, 
2002; Weitzman, 1993), politics, power and democracy (Adler and Webster, 1995; 
De Soysa, Oneal and Park, 1997; Lemke and Reed, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; 
Offe and Adler, 1991), energy (Kern and Smith, 2008; Meadowcroft, 2009; Mead-
ows et al., 1972; Batinge, Musango and Brent, 2019), health (Frenk et al., 1991; 
Mackenbach, 1994), environment (van den Bergh, 2007). Whereas economic 
studies on transition tend to focus on economic instruments and consequences 
(e.g. privatization and its efficiency effects, climate policies and their economic 
costs), later studies, especially those from sociology, highlight societal change, 
social policies and the need to build public support for transition (e.g. displaced 
workers and retraining) (e.g. Sovacool, 2014; Sovacool and Dworkin, 2015; Jen-
kins et al., 2016; Jenkins, McCauley and Forman, 2017; Sovacool et al., 2017). 
More recent studies identify politics, power dynamics and political economy as a 
third essential ingredient in transition management (e.g. Healy and Barry, 2017; 
Cherp et al., 2018; Geels, 2014; Newell and Mulvaney, 2013).
In the literature on SDG transformations, The World in 2050 Report goes furthest 
in capturing the scale of the governance challenges facing sustainable development 
(TWI2050, 2018). It draws on many salient developments in theory and practice 
from different disciplinary perspectives on transition management. To support 
transformations, the report proposes, roughly, an equal number of policy reforms in 
each dimension of sustainable development, covering (1) economic reforms in fis-
cal frameworks, corrective pricing, direct regulation, development financing, pub-
licly directed R&D, among others; (2) political reforms for integrated planning, 
public deliberation, partnerships, independent planning agencies, cross-border 
cooperation, democratic oversight of science and technology, official SDG data; 
and (3) social reforms for public awareness, social norms and cultural innovations, 
grassroots activism, investment activism, consumer activism, shareholder activism 
and moral activism (TWI2050, 2018:, 24-27). Overall, it sets out a requirement for 
a wide range of policy instruments to steer the economy and society towards trans-
formations, and avoids the tendency to overemphasize economic instruments (e.g. 
tax-and-spend policies) and magic bullets (e.g. carbon pricing), and places an 
important emphasis on enabling political and social innovations. 
The proposals of this research have yet to make significant inroads into national 
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382 reference to SDG transformations. However, according to the most recent SDSN 
report (2019), “many governments have asked the SDSN and members of its 
Leadership Council how they might organize the implementation of the SDGs” 
and the transformation approach could become more popular in the second cycle 
of VNRs, particularly in view of support for this approach from international 
agencies such as the UN, OECD and IIASA. For most countries, this would rep-
resent major governance restructuring. The governance reforms outlined for the 
SDGs in the first cycle of VNRs, 2015-19, largely focus on updating national 
sustainable development strategies to reflect the SDGs; determining the level of 
political engagement, mainstreaming and mapping of SDGs responsibilities 
across government ministries, the introduction of mechanisms for interdepart-
mental coordination, etc. (e.g. Niestroy et al., 2019; Kindornay, 2019; OECD, 
2019; Sachs et al., 2019b). While countries differ in the scale and pace of reform 
(Sachs et al., 2019b, 2018), there is, for most countries, an enormous governance 
gap between the reforms that have been implemented and those that have been 
proposed for implementing suitable frameworks for SDG transformations, e.g. 
such as in the TWI2050 report. 
To fill the governance gap, the SDG transformation literature recognizes five 
obstacles or points of resistance to governance reform. These are vested interests, 
such as the owners of fossil fuels and beneficiaries or unsustainable land and 
ocean practices, regulatory capture, the resistance of powerful elites to taxation, 
redistribution and regulation, the lack of planning due to short-run political cycles 
and weak government capacities, and a lack of public awareness and understand-
ing about transformations (TWI2050, 2018). This article focuses on strategies for 
buying out or easing opposition from vested interests that may try to block the 
enactment of transformations.
3 COMPENSATION STRATEGIES FOR ENACTING REFORM
An interesting analogy can be drawn between the structural problems facing post-
Soviet economies on the eve of their transition from socialism to capitalism and 
the climate predicament facing today’s fossil-fuel based capitalist economies. 
In central and eastern Europe, several decades of unfettered state-run communism 
distorted the sectoral composition of output in these economies, with, for exam-
ple, over-production of heavy manufactures and under-production of light manu-
factures and other consumer goods. After decades of built-up inefficiencies, a 
rapid restructuring was required to downsize the state sector and prepare the 
ground for the development of non-state sector enterprises. Whereas the managers 
and workers of state-owned companies and sectoral ministries posed a significant 
“vested interest” obstacle to capitalist reform in post-Soviet economies, it is the 
owners of fossil fuels that, arguably, present the greatest “vested interest” obstacle 
to energy decarbonization. In a similar way, in today’s capitalist economies, sev-
eral decades of not internalizing the environmental costs of economic activity, nor 
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383duced carbon-intensive goods and under-produced clean energy-intensive goods. 
The result is an over-sized fossil-fuel sector and a relatively small low-carbon 
energy sector. With planetary boundaries fast approaching (e.g. IPBES, 2019; 
WEF, 2019; IPCC, 2018; Grooten and Almond, 2018; Rockstrom et al. 2009), 
there is now an urgent and compelling case for a major restructuring of today’s 
economies to correct these accumulated distortions. 
Following the collapse of communism, it was widely believed that a window of 
opportunity existed in post-Soviet bloc countries for the enactment of pro-market 
reforms. This involved a shift from planned contracts in production; the removal 
or phasing out of price controls; the privatization of state-owned assets; the crea-
tion of a labour market; and the development of small and medium-sized private 
enterprises. Scholars debated whether these reforms should be adopted as fast as 
possible, and made as irreversible as possible (e.g. Lipton and Sachs, 1990; Bal-
cerowicz, 1995), or through a more gradual sequencing of reforms that aimed to 
build support for further reforms (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a, 1992b, 
1995; Wei, 1997; McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Litwack and Qian, 1999). The 
most controversial of these debates focused on the privatization of state assets.
The concern for political constraints in the transition from socialism to capitalism 
led to significant developments in political economy theory concerned with the 
enactment of reform (e.g., Dewatripont and Roland, 1995; Roland, 2000). Two 
types of political constraints can be identified in transition processes: feasibility 
constraints affecting the enactment of reforms, termed ex-ante political con-
straints, and constraints to maintain reforms, once they are put in place, referred 
to as ex-post political constraints (Roland, 2002). This paper focuses on strategies 
to ease ex-ante political constraints, i.e. those on the enactment of reform, which 
is the first step towards initiating transformation. 
THREE COMPENSATION STRATEGIES TO ENACTING REFORM
This article considers strategies to implement full reform, whether now or in the 
future. I focus on the big-bang and gradualist strategies proposed in the political 
economy literature. Drawing heavily on the review article of Roland (2002), the 
article considers three main strategies for relaxing political constraints so that full 
reforms can be enacted. These are,
(1) Compensating transfers to buy acceptance for full reform.
(2) Optimal sequencing of partial reforms aimed at building constituencies for 
further reform.
(3) Partial reform involving divide and rule tactics to reduce opposition to 
future reform. 
The first strategy, compensating transfers to buy the acceptance of those who 
stand to lose from full reform, has deep roots in economic theory. The traditional 
solution to compensating potential losers standing in the way of reform that would 
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384 system to offset the welfare losses of the losers by redistributing the gains of the 
winners (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks 1939; 1940). These transfers may require govern-
ment to commit to a series of transfer payments to losers over time or an upfront 
payment of the net present value of these transfers (Roland, 2002). 
It is well known that the solution is (Pareto) efficient if lump-sum transfers are an 
available policy instrument, the identities of the winners and losers are known ex-
ante, and there are no commitment constraints faced by government (Mirrlees, 
1971). However, inefficiencies can arise if transfers are financed by distortionary 
taxes, or transfers involve leakages stemming from asymmetric information, i.e. if 
government cannot distinguish losers (Mirrlees, 1971; Lewis, Feenstra and Ware, 
1989). Furthermore, the strategy may be infeasible given short-term budget and 
borrowing constraints or if government lacks a mechanism to credibly commit 
future government to a series of transfer payments over time (Roland, 2002).
It is important to distinguish financial and non-financial transfers. Financial trans-
fers usually involve distortionary taxation. Roland (2002) points out that these 
distortions may have been especially high in transition economies, since at this 
time, government capacity for domestic resource mobilization was relatively low. 
However, compensation packages need not involve financial transfers (Martinelli 
and Tommasi, 1997). The mass privatization of state assets that favoured insiders 
in Russia and Czechoslovakia can be seen as a lump-sum transfer of real assets to 
buy political acceptance for pro-market reforms. Privatization usually has high 
policy reversal costs which can act as a credible device to buy out losers. 
The second strategy, an optimal sequencing of reforms, starts with an initial partial 
reform, e.g. partial privatization. A key argument in favour of partial reform is 
gradualism, which argues that an appropriate sequencing of reforms can build 
constituencies for further reforms (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992b; 1995; 
Wei, 1997; McMillan and Naughton, 1992; Litwack and Qian, 1999). The main 
idea behind the optimal sequencing strategy is to target areas where reforms are 
expected to be more popular (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). For example, in 
Hungary and East Germany, the most profitable firms tended to be privatized first 
(Gatsios, 1992; Carlin and Meyer, 1992), which can be seen as a way to build sup-
port for further privatization, leaving the least popular, and probably most expen-
sive, e.g. large loss-making enterprises, until later (Roland, 2002). 
The optimal sequencing strategy can be more attractive than compensating losers 
for full reform, if there is considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of losses 
from reform and uncertainty about the gains from reform (Dewatripont and 
Roland, 1992b). A positive resolution of uncertainty in areas with better prospects 
for “good” outcomes can then build wider support for reform in other areas 
(Roland, 2002). The strategy can be particularly attractive, because it lowers the 
cost of compensating losers, at least in the short-run, especially if there are high 
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385(Dewatripont and Roland, 1992b; Nielsen, 1993). On the other hand, the strategy 
introduces distortions in terms of forgone efficiency gains from complete reform, 
especially if there are complementarities among reforms (Roland, 2002). 
The third strategy, divide-and-rule tactics, is a gradualist strategy that aims to 
sequence reforms in such a way as to successively weaken the opposition from 
strategic losers to reform (e.g. Dewatripont and Roland, 1992a; Wei, 1997). This 
involves designing a sequence of compensation packages that successively under-
mine the status quo. The strategy aims to split strategic losers into small groups, 
and to offer compensation packages for reforms that make each group worse off 
in each successive round. 
SOME LESSONS FROM THE TRANSITION ECONOMY EXPERIENCE
The post-Soviet economies have since undergone the changes commonly associ-
ated with capitalist development. Arguably, the most significant of these was the 
privatization of state assets, which involved significant asset stripping by insiders, 
in many countries. The various privatization schemes have shown enormous vari-
ation in terms of both their economic consequences and their political implica-
tions, effects largely unanticipated at the outset, which are difficult to capture in 
standard economic analyses (Roland, 2002). Most experts did not anticipate the 
political use of privatization as a compensation device, or its political implica-
tions, e.g. increased rent seeking and state capture, political instability, formation 
of large financial groups (Roland, 2002).
There is striking similarity between the economic effects of these various privati-
zation schemes and the predictions from macroeconomic models of the impacts of 
climate policies on the economy (e.g. Stern, 2007; Nordhaus, 2008; IPCC, 2014: 
223-252). In most of the transition economies of central and eastern Europe, 
industry output declined after price liberalization, which extended for long peri-
ods particularly in countries that initiated big bang privatizations, and that were 
eventually compensated by growth thereafter (Dollar and Ljunggren, 1997). 
Countries that employed gradualist reforms generally experienced less pro-
nounced or shorter economic contractions.
4 APPLICATION TO THE SDGS
This section outlines three compensatory strategies for dealing with strategic los-
ers in the context of governance reforms for SDG transformations. It explores the 
political feasibility of these strategies for different stylized country examples, 
focusing on two main aspects relevant in a democratic context: the degree of pub-
lic support for transformation and the extent of state capture by ‘losers’. 
I define full reform as the implementation of a new governance framework along 
the lines proposed in the TWI2050 report. Partial reform can take a wide variety 
of forms. Three examples, useful for our purposes, are 1) partial reform involving 


























































43 (4) 375-400 (2019)
386 as city, county or state, called geographic reform, 2) partial reform involving full 
reform in a specific sector, e.g. electricity or buildings, termed sectoral reform, 
and 3) partial reform involving full reform in one dimension of sustainable devel-
opment, e.g. political, social or economic, called dimensional reform.
To illustrate the framework, I use suggestive examples from energy decarboniza-
tion and draw on studies of technical roadmaps for decarbonizing energy systems, 
covering sectors such as power, transport, buildings, and industrial processes that 
need to be localized to specific countries (e.g. SDSN and FEEM, 2019; IEA, 2017; 
SDSN and IDDRI, 2015).
The three compensation strategies for easing political constraints to governance 
reform are:
(1) Big-bang governance reform.
(2) Optimal sequencing governance reform.
(3) Divide and rule governance reform.
Big-bang governance reform involves compensating or buying out strategic losers 
for the full implementation of a new governance framework. In the case of decar-
bonization, this would involve implementing the full set of proposed economic, 
social and political reforms in each of the four sectors in a particular country. 
Reforms may include corrective economic policy instruments, e.g. carbon tax, 
removal of fossil fuel subsidies, new fiscal frameworks for clean energy invest-
ments, green R&D subsidies, regulatory standards such as emissions limits for 
buildings and vehicles, energy efficiency requirements, independent long-term plan-
ning agencies, institutions for public deliberation, new financial partnerships, public 
awareness campaigns, and support for social movements, etc. (TWI2050, 2018).
Optimal sequencing governance reform involves enacting partial governance 
reform in areas, sectors or dimensions of sustainable development that are likely to 
generate positive outcomes that can help to build support for further reforms in other 
areas, sectors or dimensions. For example, this might involve implementing full 
reform in electricity, which is expected to be the easiest-to-decarbonize sector, in the 
hope of creating support for future reform in transport, which is expected to be a 
more difficult-to-decarbonize sector, and so on (Lazard, 2017; Davis et al., 2018). 
Alternatively, it could involve full reform in cities or states where the prospects for 
good outcomes are high in the hope of building support for reform in other cities or 
states with weaker prospects. Similarly, it could involve a sequence of reforms that 
focuses first on political reforms, then social reforms and finally economic reforms 
(or vice versa). In practice, the optimal sequence of compensation packages may 
mix aspects of geographic, sectoral and dimensional governance reform. 
Divide-and-rule governance reform involves implementing a sequence of partial 
reforms that aims successively to undermine the opposition of ‘losers’ to further 
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387coalitions for reform in areas, sectors or dimensions that are significant sources of 
revenue or rent for the remaining losers. By successively implementing such 
reforms, the strategy seeks to iteratively weaken the opposition of ‘losers’ by low-
ering the required compensation packages to buy their acceptance for reform. 
To assess the political feasibility of the each of the strategies in different contexts 
or countries, I focus on democratic countries and outline three types of stylized 
countries.
The first type of country is referred to as the progressives. These are countries 
characterized by strong public support for transformation and a government that 
is weakly captured by strategic losers, i.e. compensation packages could be 
designed to buy the acceptance of ‘losers’ for full reform. In the case of decar-
bonization, these might be countries where there is a majority of citizens who rank 
climate policy as a high priority policy issue, a small fossil-fuel sector and rapidly 
growing green economy. Leading examples of such countries might be Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland or Spain.
The second type of country is the captured. These are countries with governments 
that are strongly captured by potential ‘losers’ of transformations, such that feasi-
ble reform packages could only buy a small amount of governance reform. In the 
case of decarbonization, these countries typically have large fossil-fuel sectors. 
Among these countries, it is useful to distinguish first, those with weak public sup-
port for decarbonization, e.g. Russia, and those with majority support for public 
action to reduce GHG emissions, e.g. USA. Second, it is also useful to distinguish 
these countries by the importance for their fossil fuel sectors of domestic markets, 
e.g. USA, and those that depend primarily on foreign markets for revenue, e.g. 
Norway.1 The size of the green energy sector in captured countries can differ 
widely, e.g. compare Russia, USA and Norway. 
The third type of country I refer to as the moderates. These countries may have 
average or even strong public support for SDG transformations. However, their 
governments are moderately captured by strategic losers, i.e. compensation pack-
ages can only succeed in buying partial reform. In the case of decarbonization, 
countries with a large fossil-fuel sector that have made some notable efforts in 
developing green energy are likely to qualify as moderates. A leading example of 
such a country is Germany. 
POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
I now outline four hypotheses concerning the political feasibility of compensation 
strategies for dealing with strategic losers in the differently stylized countries. A 
short motivation in support of each hypothesis is given. Table 1 summarizes the 
main hypotheses presented in this section:
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Hypothesis 1: If there is weak state capture and a majority will for reform, then a 
big bang governance reform strategy is likely to be politically feasible in progres-
sive countries.
This hypothesis is motivated by recent examples such as the Green New Deals of 
Spain and New York, California’s Renewable Portfolio Standards, Iceland’s Cli-
mate Action Plan 2018-2030, among others, as well as the pioneering roles some 
countries played in climate and energy policies, e.g. Denmark, Sweden, Finland 
(CPUC, 2017; Sovacool, 2017).2 These examples suggest: there are administra-
tions willing to lead on decarbonization and fuller (political and social) reforms 
could be feasible with appropriately designed compensation packages to broaden 
acceptance for such reforms. 
Hypothesis 2: If there is moderate state capture and a majority will for reform, 
then optimal sequencing of governance reforms is likely to be politically feasible 
in moderate countries. 
The German experience with Energiewende, its Coal Exit Commission and gov-
ernment support for clean energy investments suggests there are countries where 
an optimal sequencing of governance reforms that aim to gradually phase out the 
fossil-fuel sector may be politically feasible, despite significant capture of the 
state by these interests. In such contexts, better designed compensation packages 
could be important for improving the effectiveness of existing reforms and broad-
ening support for future reforms.3
2 See New York’s Climate Mobilization Act, April 2019. For Iceland’s Climate Action Plan 2018-2030, see 
Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources (2018). For a more recent announcement at the Climate 
Action Summit 2019 by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland and Norway to negotiate a new ‘Agreement 
on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability’, see Steenblik and Droege (2019).
3 For a critique of German Energiewende that focuses on competing interests, uncoordinated government min-
istries and weaknesses in the hierarchical, part captured, governance model used for transition, see Dohmen 
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389Hypothesis 3: If there is strong state capture and public support for reform, then a 
divide-and-rule governance reform strategy is likely to be politically feasible in 
captured countries with large domestic markets.
In captured countries, if there is significant heterogeneity across subnational 
administrative units in terms of local government capture and local majority will 
for reform, then subnational governments could be encouraged to adopt either full 
or partial reforms, particularly if these governments are progressive or moderate 
respectively. The idea here is to implement geographic reform in subnational areas 
or sectoral reform that will weaken the position of vested interests at the national 
level. If successful, these reforms could build constituencies for further reform in 
other areas or sectors and thus, successively lower the required compensation 
packages for buying reforms at national level.
It is recognized that subnational and non-state actors may have an important role 
in climate mitigation (e.g. Hsu et al., 2016; Hale, 2016; Chan et al., 2015; Hale 
and Roger, 2014). In the case of the United States at federal level, it is unlikely 
compensating transfers would have public or lobby support given the size and 
influence of its fossil-fuel industry. For example, in 2014, the profits of public 
companies engaged in fossil-fuel activities in North America were $257 billion 
and $326 million was invested in lobbying and campaign funds in the 113th Con-
gress.4 Yet, a divide-and-rule strategy may be feasible because states and sectors 
differ in terms of public support for climate actions and regulatory capture.
For example, California has recently implemented stricter vehicle emission stand-
ards than the Federal government, standards that have been adopted in thirteen 
other states. California accounts for 12% of all vehicle sales in the USA and 
together with the thirteen other states, they collectively account for approximately 
one third of the US car market.5 Similarly, the 2008-09 auto-industry bailout 
involved stricter Federal vehicle emission standards. These examples suggest that 
subnational and sectoral reforms can potentially weaken the market shares of 
dominant fossil fuel interests and therefore, the compensation required to buy 
acceptance for governance reform at federal level. 
Hypothesis 4: If there is strong state capture in an exporting country, then a divide-
and-rule strategy is likely to be politically feasible if the import countries are 
progressive/moderate.
Whereas hypothesis three exploits fragmentation within captured countries, this 
hypothesis is based on fragmentation outside these countries. The main idea is that 
implementation of full or partial reform in markets that are key sources of revenue 
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390 For example, Norway, like many oil producing nations, exports much of its oil and 
gas, and despite strong domestic support for climate action, its welfare system and 
support for its government depend, at least in part, on these export revenues 
(IRENA, 2019: 33). Progressive reforms in EU countries, the principal export 
destination, especially in transport, could help to weaken the opposition of the 
Norwegian Petroleum Industry to compensatory reforms. Such compensation 
packages will likely require the participation of regional partners, e.g. packages 
similar to EU Structural Funds.
 
5 DISCUSSION
The article outlines a set of strategies that can be used for implementing new gov-
ernance frameworks for SDG transformations. At the core of each of these strate-
gies is the idea of compensating strategic losers to buy their acceptance for gov-
ernance reforms to prevent their continued blocking of transformations necessary 
for achieving the SDGs.
A limitation of the article is that it does not trace out the likely effects of each of 
these strategies, focusing instead on their political feasibility across stylized coun-
try examples. However, I believe that the identification of these strategies can pro-
vide a useful point of reference for framing discussions about how to implement 
new governance frameworks for sustainable development. Such a framing is lack-
ing in current debates on governance for SDG transformations, which tend to focus 
on the characteristics of good governance frameworks, rather than how to deal with 
strategic losers, i.e. those who stand to lose most from changes in the status quo.
More research is needed on how to optimally design compensation packages to 
buy the acceptance of losers from governance reforms. The paper has not built a 
model to identify the characteristics of optimal compensation in the context of 
SDG transformations. The transition economy experience highlights that different 
compensation packages can lead to enormous variation in their effects. Important 
consideration needs to be given not just to economic effects, but also to the politi-
cal and social implications of such reform packages. The case of Russia highlights 
that poorly designed compensation packages can serve to simply increase the 
power of vested interests with the benefits of reform concentrated within these 
interests. The bank and auto-industry bailouts suggest piecemeal policy changes 
are unlikely to achieve transformation (e.g. Dellisanti and Wagner, 2018; McNulty 
and Wisner, 2014). These bailouts highlight government’s willingness to spend 
large amounts of money on strategic losers in a crisis and the importance of get-
ting a good deal for the public in terms of new governance frameworks. Research 
is also needed on the appropriate mix of financial and non-financial compensation, 
e.g. stock options in the green economy, and how costs ought to be distributed 
across generations. There is a strong case for debt-financed compensation that 
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391The article proposes three compensation strategies for enacting governance 
reforms. However, other strategies are also possible. For example, the political 
economy literature refers to dual-track price liberalization, as was used in China, 
as a successful example of a gradualist strategy to implement capitalist reform 
(Roland, 2002). In a decarbonization context, a dual track strategy may be to 
maintain existing contracts for strategic losers, e.g. coal power plants, but to 
implement new governance reforms at the margin, e.g. require additional con-
tracts use green energy. Compensation in this approach is implicit; the coal indus-
try keeps its existing contracts (Burtraw and Palmer, 2008). 
Such a strategy may be an important building block for governance reforms to 
emerge that later could be combined with the compensation strategies outlined in 
this article to buy the acceptance of losers for fuller reform. Germany appears to 
have a dual-track energy system and compensation packages may now be needed 
to improve the effectiveness of the phase-out of coal. A dual-track strategy may 
also be useful for progressive or moderate countries in the developing world as way 
of dealing with increasing demands for both energy and climate commitments. 
More research is also needed to examine the political feasibility of transforma-
tions in different contexts. This paper has considered two highly stylized aspects 
of democratic systems, yet political feasibility is more contextual than suggested 
here and the relevance of other aspects needs to be assessed. For example, a limi-
tation of the proposed strategies is the potential for retaliation. In response to 
California’s stricter emission controls, the US Federal government stripped the 
state of its right to set its own vehicle emission standards, which is now likely to 
spark a legal battle over states’ rights. Further research is also needed to under-
stand political feasibility in developing countries and non-democratic settings, 
e.g. authoritarian regimes, fragile states. 
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